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In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors examine the ways that
states could raise revenue by rethinking
whether and how they conform to the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act.
The dire revenue situation that COVID-19 has
created for state and local governments is a welldocumented and looming reality for state
legislatures. We and others have explored a
variety of ways that states should respond to this
crisis in prior articles as a part of Project SAFE
(State Action in Fiscal Emergencies), an academic

effort to help states weather the fiscal crisis by
providing policy recommendations backed by
1
2
research. We think, as do many others, that in the
absence of sufficient federal action, the states
should prioritize raising revenue through
targeted taxes on economic actors that are best
enduring the crisis, rather than cutting services
needed to protect state economies or state
3
residents suffering more from the crisis.
With those background goals, this article
focuses on the ways that states could raise revenue
by rethinking whether and how they conform to
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. This article is the first in
a planned two-part series, with this article
focusing on strategic nonconformity with the
TCJA for state-level personal income taxes, and
with the planned second article in the series to
then focus on strategic nonconformity with the
TCJA for state-level corporate income taxes.
The TCJA was signed into law December 22,
2017, and went into effect January 1, 2018.4 That
timing, along with the rushed manner in which
the bill was introduced and debated in Congress,
meant that states had little time to respond. States
that conformed to the tax code on a rolling basis
had to affirmatively act if they wanted to decouple
from those changes, which obviously put them in
a difficult position. Fixed conformity states faced

1

Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471; University of
Virginia School of Law, Project SAFE; David Gamage and Darien
Shanske, “States Should Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms,” Tax Notes
State, May 18, 2020, p. 859; Adam Thimmesch, “State Tax Conformity:
The CARES Act and Beyond,” Tax Notes State, May 25, 2020, p. 987.
2

Carolina Vargas, “Massachusetts Economists Push for Higher Taxes
Amid Pandemic,” Tax Notes Today State, May 29, 2020.
3

See Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal
Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010).
4

Some provisions, like the full expensing, applied retroactively. See 26
U.S.C. section 168(k)(6)(a)(i) (granting a 100 percent allowance for some
assets placed in service after September 27, 2017).
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similar issues. They had to update their
conformity dates if they wanted to adopt the
changes in the TCJA and had to affirmatively
carve out any modifications that they did not wish
to adopt.5 Most states tended to follow their
default positions of conformity and adopted the
majority of the TCJA’s changes, with the most
notable exception being the treatment of the
revenue-raising provisions aimed at U.S.
multinationals.
In the flurry of activity surrounding the TCJA,
most state legislatures did not think deeply about
how their tax bases should relate to the federal
base. That response was understandable given
that legislatures are busy and that the country was
in the midst of an economic expansion. But the
time has come for states to take a more careful
look at TCJA conformity.
Why States Should Respond Strategically
States have not generally responded
strategically6 to federal tax law, much less to the
TCJA. The revenue hole that states now find
themselves in should be enough reason for them
to change course. But there are several other
reasons as well. First, this pandemic has
presented states with challenges they could not
have anticipated, and recovery will take sacrifice
by many for the long-term benefit of the whole
community. It might sound hokey to some, but
joint sacrifice is important nonetheless. To the
extent that some taxpayers are receiving tax
benefits at the federal level, asking them to pay
more at the state level is, all else equal, a
reasonable request.
Second, the scale of the emergency requires a
massive federal response, but such a response has
not been forthcoming. Clawing back windfalls
doled out by the TCJA would be an exercise in
self-help akin to how states have had to scramble
to get protective equipment for their first

5

California, a static conformity state, took an intermediate approach.
It did not update its conformity date but selected specific provisions in
the TCJA that it would conform with. See Kathleen K. Wright,
“California Conformity to TCJA (The ‘Light’ Version of Conformity),”
Tax Notes State, July 29, 2019, p. 405.
6

For further development of some of these arguments, as well as the
argument that states can conform strategically, see Shanske, “States Can
and Should Respond Strategically to Federal Tax Law,” 45 Ohio N.L. Rev.
543 (2019).

18

responders. If the federal government will not do
its job and provide states with the support they
need, the states must secure revenue for
themselves.
State action as self-help is all the more
compelling if the federal government is not doing
its job based on a belief that it cannot afford to.7
8
We think that belief is false, but even if it were
true, the unavailability of funds would be in part
a result of Congress giving huge tax breaks
during an economic expansion. If the federal
government will not claw back that money now
that it is desperately needed, the states should do
it themselves.
Third, our proposals all represent good tax
policy on their own; we are not proposing that
states conform strategically for no other reason
than that they can. Take our proposal to impose a
surcharge on qualfied business income (QBI), for
instance. If taxpayers responded to our proposed
state surcharges on QBI by not distorting their
businesses to generate QBI, then our proposal
would increase the efficiency of the tax system,
including at the federal level.
There is another efficiency benefit to our
proposals. Take depreciation. Given the size of the
federal tax burden relative to that of any state tax
burden, or even many states’ tax burdens, the
state-level tax associated with strategic
nonconformity will be small. Therefore, firms are
likely to respond to the federal incentive and not
change their behavior (much) because of the statelevel change.9
Fourth, as for states with politicians trying to
avoid framing their decision against the backdrop
of federal failure, there is a parallel argument. If
the federal government is correct to be stepping
back, then the states have to step up — at least to
an extent. In this way, state (and local)
governments need to grow in order for the federal
government to (safely) recede and for the size of
government to shrink overall.

7

Burgess Everett, “McConnell Slams Brakes on Next Round of
Coronavirus Aid,” Politico, Apr. 21, 2020.
8

See Jim Tankersley, “How Washington Learned to Embrace the
Budget Deficit,” The New York Times, May 16, 2020.
9

Shanske, “Expanding State Fiscal Capacity, Part I: Combining an
Entity-Level Consumption Tax, Improved Sales Factor Apportionment,
and a Tax on a Federal Windfall (the QBI Deduction),” 22 Fla. Tax Rev.
448, 462-64 (2019).

TAX NOTES STATE, JULY 6, 2020
®
Electronic
copy
available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3675778
For more
Tax Notes
Stateat:
content,
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT

Conformity, the TCJA, and the
Personal Income Tax
The most significant TCJA changes to the
personal income tax were modifications to the
rate schedules, personal exemptions, and the
10
standard and itemized deductions. The federal
rate changes obviously did not affect states’ rates
and many states changed their own laws to offset
the revenue-raising effects that the other federal
11
changes would have had on their residents.
During this fiscal emergency, states should
be focused on raising revenue from their most
fortunate residents to ensure the health, safety,
and welfare of the entire community. In that vein,
we suggest that states modify their rate
structures to make their taxes more progressive
rather than tinkering with personal exemptions
or standard deductions. That recommendation
certainly applies to the nine states that impose
flat income taxes. Those states should impose
graduated rates, at least for a limited period (for
instances, as temporary high-income
surcharges).
States that already have graduated rate
structures should also look to either add brackets
or to raise the tax rates for those in the highest
brackets. That recommendation applies especially
forcefully for the many states that have graduated
structures that are effectively flat. For example,
the top bracket in many states kicks in once an
individual has under $20,000 of taxable income.12
Those structures are progressive in name only.
And while those states may not be willing to
abandon their overall economic or political goals
underlying those effectively flat rate structures,
they should ask for more from their millionaires
than from their entry-level schoolteachers during
a global pandemic. High-income taxpayers

received the bulk of the tax cuts from the TCJA
and have greater capacity to shoulder the state tax
burden. Again, at a minimum, temporary
surcharges on the highest-income state taxpayers
could help state governments endure the coming
fiscal storms.
It is worth underscoring here the tautology
that an income tax is a tax on income. Suppose
someone in the restaurant business earned a high
income in tax years 2018 and 2019, and thus
profited handsomely from the TCJA. In 2020 this
taxpayer earns much less because of the
pandemic. Adding a new higher bracket or two
will have little or no affect on her while she is
down, although she might well need to pay more
when her earnings have been restored.
There is also a more direct way to claw back
some of the windfall given to high earners by the
TCJA: States could affirmatively tax their
13
residents’ “QBI windfalls.” The 20 percent QBI
deduction of section 199A was one of the more
questionable provisions in the law14 and served
largely to retain a consistent tax rate differential
for taxpayers who earned income through
investments in C corporations and through
15
passthrough entities. It is unclear, though, why
maintaining this arbitrary rate distinction is a
preferred policy goal, and in any event, the TCJA
did not completely accomplish that goal. The QBI
deduction is not available for all taxpayers and is
subject to a variety of conditions and phaseouts.
The QBI deduction is also highly regressive.
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that
more than three-fourths of the benefit would go to
16
those earning $200,000 and above. Those with
earnings above $1 million received nearly half the
17
benefit. The deduction was therefore not only
distortionary, but regressive as well.

10

The Joint Committee on Taxation, “Estimated Budget Effects of the
Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, The ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’” (Dec. 18,
2017).
11

See, e.g., Betsy Z. Russell, “Senate Tax Panel Endorses HB 675, the
Bill to Raise the Child Tax Credit to $205,” The Spokesman-Review (Mar.
20, 2018); Scott Dance, “Maryland Senate Passes Bill to Save Taxpayers
$1.2B in First Response to Trump Tax Reform,” The Baltimore Sun, Feb. 6,
2018; Martha Stoddard, Joe Duggan, and Emily Nitcher, “Nebraska
Legislators Pass Measure Tackling Unintended Tax Increases, Other
Bills,” Omaha World-Herald, Apr. 12, 2018; and Jared Walczak,
“Minnesota Policymakers Strike Tax Conformity Deal,” Tax Foundation
(June 11, 2019).
12

Katherine Loughead, “State Individual Income Tax Rates and
Brackets for 2020,” Tax Foundation (Feb. 4, 2020).

13

Shanske, supra note 9, at 487-99.

14

Daniel Shaviro, “Evaluating the New U.S. Pass-Through Rules,” 1
Brit. Tax Rev. 49 (2018).
15

Michael S. Knoll, “The TCJA and the Questionable Incentive to
Incorporate,” Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 2019, p. 977.
16

Joint Committee on Taxation, “Tables Related to the Federal Tax
System as in Effect 2017 through 2026, Table 3” (Apr. 24, 2018).
17
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Almost no states conformed to the QBI
deduction for purposes of their own personal
18
income taxes, and for good reason. The dubious
policy reason given for this change at the federal
level did not apply at the state level given the lack
of state corporate tax rate changes. The states that
have not yet decoupled from the section 199A
deduction should do so now. We also think that
states should go further and affirmatively tax
their residents’ QBI windfalls. The section 199A
deduction granted those residents saves them
from paying federal income tax on up to 20
percent of their earnings. That windfall thus
increased those residents’ tax paying capacities
and represents a pool of funds that states could
access in a progressive way to help the entirety of
the state.
Our proposal would not be to tax the QBI
benefit retroactively, and so only current and
future beneficiaries would pay the tax. Further,
we would propose clawing back the benefit only
at higher-income levels. Again, the idea is that
those who can pay more should pay more in the
current emergency, and that in particular, they
should pay out of their ill-conceived federal
windfall.

necessary, even if advisable for other reasons. But
all else is not equal. The public health emergency,
along with the limited federal response, has
created a significant and pressing need for
additional state revenue. States must look for
ways to raise revenue to ensure both the shortand long-term health and success of their
residents. We have suggested some in this article,
and states should pay attention to the broader
range of proposals being outlined as a part of
Project SAFE as they work to address their
revenue needs.


Conclusion
State and local governments play a critical role
in the health, safety, and welfare of their residents.
The pandemic provides a stark reminder that
states are on the front lines in the effort to
ameliorate human suffering and that their efforts
require funding. Strategically rethinking
conformity with the revenue-raisers included in
the TCJA can form important components of the
state government responses, and we thus suggest
that states take those steps.
Of course, many will argue that now is not the
time to raise taxes on anyone. We are sympathetic
with the notion that many are struggling and that,
all else being equal, tax increases would be best
avoided. Indeed, if the federal government did its
job, then additional state-level taxes might not be

18

Colorado, Idaho, and North Dakota all conform to the federal
definition of taxable income and none of those states have decoupled
from the section 199A deduction. Also, Iowa affirmatively elected to
phase in that deduction in connection with its change in law that will see
it conform to federal taxable income instead of adjusted gross income.
See 2018 Acts, ch. 1161, section 70.
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